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Abstract 
Past research has strongly linked moral development to a number of anti-social 
acts (Seijts & Latham, 2003) with the exception of workplace deviance (WD). This study 
explored a person-by-situation interactionist model that incorporated moral-cognitive 
development as a moderating determinant between organizational justice (OJ) and WD. 
One hundred undergraduate students read one of two hypothetical vignettes that depicted 
a student worker who experienced either an act of organizational injustice or justice. 
Participants also completed measures of moral reasoning (DIT2), OJ, intentional WD and 
a social desirability scale. Multiple Regression Analysis showed that participants who 
exhibited higher levels of the Maintaining Norms schema had lower WD intentions when 
the work situation was just, and those with higher levels of Postconventional thinking 
may be associated with lower perceptions of OJ in the unjust scenario. However, this did 
not necessarily translate to overt retaliatory behaviour towards the employer. 
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Introduction 
Workplace Deviance is a widespread and costly problem that many organizations 
encounter (Trevino &Youngblood, 1990). For example, it has been estimated that one in 
three employees have stolen from their employer at least once, and many of these people 
repeat their actions on a regular basis (Delaney, 1993). While theft is probably the most 
well known act of workplace deviance, other antisocial behaviours are regularly 
performed in the workplace by a spectrum of employees, ranging from blue-collar 
workers to white-collar workers, in both profit and non-profit organizations (Giacalone & 
Greenberg, 1997). Some examples, to demonstrate the diversity of workplace deviance, 
are behaviours such as: employee sabotage, harassment, tardiness and time theft 
(Giacalone & Greenberg). In addition, with the wide availability of the Internet in 
workplaces nowadays, checking personal e-mail and browsing the Web can be 
considered further deviant acts that are concerning employers. For example, a survey 
conducted in 2005 revealed that employers pay their employees almost $760 billion a 
year for spending work time on the Internet, for non-work related reasons (Freedman, 
2006). 
Many theories exists that attempt to explain how workplace deviance is engendered, 
especially ones that involve perceptions of organizational fairness. For example, Equity 
Theory, which was first proposed by Adams (1965), asserts that stealing from an 
organization can be understood as an attempt to re-establish equity between the parties 
involved (i.e., between the employee(s) and the organization) in a social exchange 
relationship (Greenberg, 1997). The Relational Model of Organizational Justice is 
another example and it is concerned with how the worker is led to believe that he or she 
2 
is being treated fairly or unfairly by the organization, by taking into account several 
justice-related elements that lead the worker to either act in a cooperative or 
uncooperative manner towards the organization in which he or she works (Lind, 1997). 
However, perceived fairness, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to motivate employee 
theft. Whereas most employees probably experience some level of injustice at some 
point in their careers, only a portion of workers make the conscious decision to retaliate 
against the organization by engaging in some form of deviant behaviour (Greenberg, 
2002). Why is this? One possible solution is that the relationship between inequity and 
workplace deviance needs to be elaborated further by taking into account dispositional 
traits (Trevino, 1986). In other words, there needs to be a model that takes a person-by-
situation interactionist approach to explaining workplace deviance. 
Trevino (1986) outlined some individual characteristics that moderate the relationship 
between organizational justice and workplace deviance, such as personality, ego strength, 
intelligence, field dependence and locus of control. Moral reasoning is one such 
individual factor that has yet to be extensively examined by researchers. Moral 
reasoning is defined as a person's mental representation of the self as well as the person's 
ability to engage in complex reasoning of moral issues (Bennett et al., 2005). It should 
be noted that moral reasoning does not have the same meaning as the term morality, 
which is considered to be a set of codes and conduct that is set by society or an individual 
that need to be adhered to by people (Gert, 2005). 
Studies that have attempted to use Lawrence Kohlberg's (1984) theory of the six 
stages of moral reasoning as a moderating variable between organizational justice and 
workplace deviance generally found that the occurrences of Postconventional reasoning 
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levels (Kohlberg's highest level of moral reasoning) was consistently found to be low 
across these studies, making it difficult to find interaction effects (Rest et al., 1999a). 
Although Kohlberg may have argued that this was because Postconventional reasoning 
levels are difficult to reach and are rarely found in our society, Rest et al. (1999a) argued 
that Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral-cognitive development as a theory, and the 
methods he used to measure moral reasoning, may have made it too difficult for people to 
exhibit Post-conventional reasoning in research contexts. Therefore, Rest et al. 
developed the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral cognitive-development, which some 
consider to be more sensitive in detecting the variability of Post-conventional levels in 
samples. If this is true, then the increase in variability of Postconventional levels may 
allow researchers to find that moral reasoning interacts with other variables, such as 
organizational justice, to explain why workplace deviance occurs. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the current study utilized a person-by-situation 
interactionist model to explore moral reasoning (a dispositional determinant) as a 
potential moderating variable in the relationship between organizational justice (a 
situational determinant) and workplace deviance (outcome factor). However, it could be 
argued that, intuitively, it makes more sense to assign moral reasoning as the causal 
variable and organizational justice as the moderating variable because moral reasoning 
could be characterized as the more stable and enduring factor. However, it was decided 
to assign organizational justice as the causal variable because past literature has well 
established such a causal relationship between organizational justice and workplace 
deviance through experimental methodology (e.g., Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg, 1993; 
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and Greenberg, 2002). Future research should address this theoretical issue in order to 
portray a more accurate depiction of the person-situation interactionist model. 
Figure 1. A person-by-situation interactionist model integrating moral-cognitive 
development, organizational justice and workplace deviance. 
Level of Moral Cognitive-Development 
(Personal/Dispositional Factor) 
Perceived Organizational Justice • Likelihood of Engaging in 
Workplace Deviant Behaviours 
(Situational Factor) (Outcome Factor) 
The Costs of Workplace Deviance 
Antisocial behaviour in organizations has been defined as "any behaviour that brings 
harm, or is intended to bring harm, to an organization, its employees, or stakeholders" 
(Giacalone & Greenberg, p. vii). It has also been referred to as workplace deviance or 
dysfunctional behaviour (Giacalone & Greenberg) and employee counter-productivity 
(Bennett & Robinson, 1995; Boye & Jones, 1997). The term workplace deviance is used 
5 
throughout this paper because it appears to be one of the more popular terms used in 
recent research in this area. 
The media and scholarly literature have addressed concern for the rise in workplace 
deviance (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997) and its prevalence in a variety of industries 
(Boye & Jones, 1997). A survey completed by supermarket employees in 1995 revealed 
that 42% of the employees had taken cash, merchandise, and/or property from their 
employer, 29% of the employees had abused sick days, and 20% of the employees 
confessed that they had come to work hung over from alcohol in the last six months (as 
cited in Boye & Jones). Furthermore, from the same survey, 60% of restaurant 
employees admitted to some type of theft in the last six months, and 80% of restaurant 
employees admitted that they had engaged in some type of workplace deviance other than 
theft, such as using illicit drugs or alcohol at work; intentionally working in a slow or 
sloppy manner; and engaging in unsafe workplace behaviour. In terms of costs, a wide 
range of delinquent organizational behaviour, including employee theft, can cost $6 
billion to $200 billion (Murphy, 1993). Moreover, theft by employees has been blamed 
for 20%> of all business failures (Delaney, 1993). Workplace deviance also occurs at high 
levels of the most revered institutions. For example, recent attention has been given to 
white-collar crimes, as opposed to blue-collar crime. White-collar crime occurs in the 
form of financial dishonesty, at large profit and non-profit organizations, conducted by 
high-level managers, religious leaders and political leaders (Giacalone & Greenberg, 
1997). For example, Enron Corporation was a world leading energy company that 
received media attention after its directors were accused of corporate fraud and 
corruption in their accounting reporting, resulting in bankruptcy and on-going 
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prosecution (Knottnerus et al., 2006). Hence, workplace deviance is a prevalent and 
costly problem, occurring in most industries and seemingly at every level. 
Turning to Social Theory to Explain Workplace Deviant Behaviour 
Seijts and Latham (2003) called for the field of Industrial/Organizational (I/O) 
Psychology to turn to social theory as the field's foundation for research and application. 
They argued that psychology often failed to transfer knowledge across its subfields, 
although, relative to other subfields, the bridge between I/O and Social Psychology had 
always been strong because these two subfields have explored similar ideas but in 
different contexts. They further argued that this allowed for the advancement of 
knowledge because it showed that findings from within these two subfields have external 
validity. For future research, the authors suggested that I/O psychology researchers 
should attempt to integrate more social theory into their research, to help explain 
organizational behaviour phenomena. Among their suggestions for specific areas of 
research that could be conducted, was to use Kohlberg's (1984) theory of moral 
reasoning to explain why workplace deviance occurs in the workplace. 
Clearly, ethical and unethical behaviour in the workplace is an important and 
relevant social issue demanding the attention of organizational researchers (Trevino & 
Youngblood, 1990). Seijts and Latham (2003) suggested that Kohlberg's (1984) 
cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning could be one possible explanation as 
to why some people engaged in workplace deviance, such as: manipulation of the 
organization's balance sheets, insider trading, faking tests, theft, sabotage, harassment, 
cheating, violence, tardiness and absenteeism. They argued that past research has been 
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able to link ethical value development to a number of anti-social acts, including 
disobedience, cheating, aggression, and alcohol and drug use. Consequently, they felt 
that these findings had relevance to organizational researchers, who wished to pursue 
ethical value development and moral reasoning as research avenues that could explain 
workplace deviance. 
Seijts and Latham (2003) raised some interesting application questions that could 
be explored by combining morality and workplace deviance research. However, an 
important research question needs to be answered first, before application can be 
addressed: is moral reasoning a predictor of workplace deviance? By first establishing a 
link between moral reasoning and workplace deviance, further research questions can be 
addressed, and several applications may be possible. By conducting empirical research to 
evaluate these possible applications, one could potentially discover more motives behind 
counterproductive behaviors, whereby building more "complete" models in psychology 
for both Social and I/O Psychology (Seijts & Latham). 
Why does Workplace Deviance Occur? 
General Theory of Crime - Some theories have tried to address why employees 
engage in workplace deviance. For example, the concept of low self-control accounting 
for criminal activity comes from the General Theory of Crime, first proposed by 
Gottfredson and Hirschi in 1990. The theory proposed that low self-control was caused 
by ineffective child rearing and it was characterized by several traits, such as: 
impulsivity, preference for simple tasks, risk-seeking, preference for physical rather than 
mental activities, self-centeredness and quick-temperedness (Langton, Piquero & 
Hollinger, 2006). Evidence has shown that low self-control is associated with criminal 
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and analogous behaviours, if people are given the opportunity to engage in such 
behaviours (Gottfredson & Hirschi; Langton, Piquero & Hollinger). Though the theory 
has received strong empirical support, it is a topic of contention among criminologists 
and sociologists, and it continues to be debated (Langton, Piquero & Hollinger). For 
example, there is ongoing debate as to whether the theory can explain white-collar or 
corporate crime; on one hand, it can be argued that it does not make sense to believe that 
white collar workers can exhibit low self-control, and therefore, the theory does not apply 
to them, and on the other hand, it can be argued that white collar offenders can exhibit 
low self-control (Langton, Piquero & Hollinger). 
Aggression/Revenge - Bies, Tripp and Kramer (1997) argued that, in some cases, 
theft could be classified as an aggressive act, rather than an act for economic gain. They 
explained this by suggesting that sometimes employees steal items that they do not intend 
to use or sell because they realize that by taking them, they will be inflicting economic 
loss on the organization, or they will inconvenience or harm specific employees who 
need these items. In other cases, affective aggression can be explained whereby an 
employee steals from his or her workplace because he or she believes it is justified, due 
to what they conceive as income underpayment by the organization. 
When we think of revenge, we would most likely conjure up something negatively 
emotional, irrational and socially unacceptable. However, Bies, Tripp and Kramer 
(1997) argued that revenge does not necessarily have to be destructive and antisocial; it 
can also be constructive and prosocial. For example, they stated that threatening revenge 
can be a powerful tool against power abuse by authority figures in the organization, and 
sometimes it can be used for conflict resolution. Bies et al. proposed a theoretical 
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framework for understanding and explaining revenge cognitions and behaviour in the 
workplace. They argued that revenge cognitions and acts occur in response to a 
perceived personal harm or violation of the social order. That is, when an employer does 
something that seems unjust or disrupts perceived equity, the subordinate may attempt to 
restore balance and equity though his or her actions. 
Organizational Justice - Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel and Rupp (2001) argued that 
the concept of justice appeals to our moral sentiments; we feel that fairness makes things 
right. They reasoned that, every day, people face situations at work that necessitate 
casual explanations that are morally just, which in turn, motivates us to react in a 
particular way. This perspective is known as the Moral Virtues Model (Folger, 1998), 
and it states that we care about justice because many of us have basic respect for human 
dignity and worth and we want to act in accordance with this respect. Folger has 
supported this model by showing that people care about justice even when there is no 
financial gain and even when strangers are involved. 
Organizational justice scholars have, so far, identified three classes of events that are 
evaluated in terms of justice: outcomes, processes and interpersonal interactions 
(Cropanzano et al., 2001). These classes are also better known as Distributional, 
Procedural and Interactional Justice, respectively (Adams, 1965; Lind, 1997; Niehoff & 
Moorman, 1993). Distributional Justice (Equity Theory; Adams, 1965) involves 
judgments regarding the fairness of outcomes or allocations. For instance, workers, who 
perceive that their outcomes (e.g., pay, benefits, vacation time, bonuses, etc.) are not fair, 
may engage in deviant behaviours, such as theft, in order to balance out the input-output 
ratio. Also, workplace deviance could occur because a worker may have perceived that 
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there has been a breach in Interactional Justice (Lind; Niehoff & Moorman). The 
concern here is with people's perceptions of being treated in a courteous and dignified 
manner, especially by authority figures. Last, Procedural Justice is characterized as how 
fairly an organization makes decisions on issues that are relevant to a worker (Lind; 
Niehoff & Moorman). 
There has been empirical support to link organizational justice theories and 
workplace deviance. For example, in a quasi-experiment, Greenberg (1990) compared 
the theft rates within three manufacturing plants belonging to the same company. In two 
of the factories, all employees were given a pay cut of 15% over a 10-week period, due to 
the company going through a financial crisis (experimental groups), while a third factory 
experienced no pay cuts (control group). Specifically, he wanted to look at the 
phenomenon of Distributional Justice, in which there is concern over the perceptions and 
evaluations of outcomes, such as pay, in this example. Greenberg (1990) found that the 
theft rates were significantly higher within the plants in which employees experienced 
pay cuts compared to the workers in the factory who did not. Greenberg (1990) also 
noted that these results were especially interesting considering the fact that theft rates 
were consistently low in all three plants both before the pay cut and after regular rates of 
pay were reinstated. Greenberg (1993) has also been able to repeat these results in a 
laboratory setting, using undergraduate students, who had to perform a clerical task, and 
they were either adequately or inadequately compensated for their labour. 
However, Greenberg (1990) also wanted to consider the social determinants of 
organizational justice that may contribute to deviant behaviour. In the aforementioned 
study, the two experimental groups that received pay cuts also received different 
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explanations as to why they would be receiving pay cuts. One group was given an 
elaborate and caring explanation as to why the pay cuts were needed, while the other 
group was given little information or compassion as to why their pay was being cut. 
Interestingly enough, over twice as much theft occurred in the plant where the employees 
received an inadequate explanation about the need for the pay cut and little compassion. 
Ambrose and Arnaud (2005) stated that the primary focus in organizational 
justice research has been to examine the unique variance accounted for by each type of 
justice (e.g., Distributional, Procedural and Interactional Justice), in order to demonstrate 
the utility of understanding different types of justice. However, they argued that focusing 
on the unique variance may obscure the overall impact of fairness on the outcome 
variable. Consequently, other researchers have called for more attention to be given to 
overall fairness (Ambrose & Arnaud). For example, Greenberg (2001) asserted that 
when individuals develop perceptions of justice, they are making a "holistic judgment in 
which they respond to whatever information is both available and salient" (p. 211). 
Others have argued that victims of injustice will not necessarily worry about whether 
there are two or more types of justice, but rather, they will react to the general experience 
of injustice (Shapiro, 2001). Further, McClelland (1997) argued that researchers often do 
not consider the optimality of their research designs. That is, by complicating research 
designs to test for effects that are irrelevant to the research question(s), researchers risk 
reducing statistical power for detecting the effects of the greatest interest(s) to the 
researcher. In addition, by not utilizing optimal designs, researchers increase the costs to 
participants, which can be both unethical and unpractical. For instance, McClelland 
argues that the "imposition of experiment participation requirements on students in 
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introductory psychology classes is difficult to justify if subject hours are used 
inefficiently" (p. 3) and increase the unnecessary risk of harm to the participants. For 
these reasons, the current study will not measure the different facets of Organizational 
Justice but rather, a combination of the facets. 
Individual Differences - Langton, Leeper Piquero and Hollinger (2006) assert that 
because a variety of external and individual level factors related to workplace deviance 
exist, there is no single factor or theory that can account for each and every occurrence. 
For instance, even within the same company, two seemingly high-risk workers, who hold 
the same position and may possess the same demographic characteristics, are not both 
necessarily going to commit workplace deviant acts. As such, Langton et al. assert that 
there must be internal traits that predispose a worker to workplace deviance. However, 
the authors pointed out that in all of the literature on employee theft, there are few studies 
that have considered the potential role of individual dispositional traits that could predict 
workplace deviance. 
The current research considered and explored one such dispositional element: a 
person's level of moral-cognitive development. It seems intuitive to acknowledge that 
deviant behaviour does not only concern actions that are deviant from social norms, but 
could also concern deviations from our personal values, in terms of what a person 
considers to be morally right or wrong. It also seems intuitive that people make such 
moral evaluations in both social and organizational contexts, alike. In actuality, there is 
merit for exploring moral reasoning as a possible predictor of workplace deviance, on 
empirical and not just intuitive grounds. Research has linked moral reasoning levels to 
other anti-social acts (Rest et al , 1999a), such as adolescent crime (Raaijmakers, Engels, 
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& Van Hoof, 2005). As a result, it is expected that people also apply the same moral 
reasoning processes to organizational contexts. 
Kohlberg 's Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Reasoning 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to understand Lawrence Kohlberg's 
original theory of moral reasoning. He is credited with many accomplishments, including 
helping to bring about the cognitive revolution against the behaviorist paradigm prevalent 
at that time; bringing American attention to Jean Piaget's (Kohlberg's intellectual 
mentor) work; and providing a way to look at morality that went beyond that of virtues 
and traits (Narvaez, 2005). In essence, Kohlberg proposed a cognitive-developmental 
perspective of moral reasoning that could contextualize our understanding of 
organizational justice, as it relates to deviant behaviour in the workplace. 
Kohlberg believed that our moral understandings begin to develop in systematic 
ways in childhood; that there are developmental transformations in those ways of 
thinking as we grow from childhood to adulthood; and that people's level of moral 
reasoning depends on their level of cognitive development (Turiel, 2006). Kohlberg 
measured people's level of moral reasoning by presenting a series of stories, each 
reflecting a moral dilemma. The person must give a resolution of the dilemma and give 
reasons for choosing that resolution, through a rigorous interview format. By this, 
Kohlberg believed that a person's stage of moral development depends not on the 
resolution, but rather on the reasons behind that resolution. By this method, Kohlberg 
(1984) identified three levels of moral reasoning, which is further divided into two stages 
at each level. The Preconventional level would be characterized by a person's concern 
with the consequences for oneself. The Conventional level of moral reasoning would be 
14 
demonstrated by concern over upholding laws, conventional values and obedience to 
authority. Finally, the Postconventional level, which contains the highest stages of moral 
reasoning, is displayed by someone who is concerned with obeying mutually agreed upon 
laws and by the need to uphold human dignity. Further elaboration upon each of the six 
stages can be found in Duska and Whelan (1975). 
Kohlberg generated many ideas for morality research, some of which, in the last 
40 years, turned out to be useful and some not (Rest et al., 1999a). For example, while 
Kohlbergian theories have yet to be found to be useful for issues of micromorality, they 
have been found useful for issues of macromorality (Rest et al., 1999a). Macromorality 
issues concern the formal structure of society, as given by institutions, rules and roles, 
while micromorality concern issues dealing with face-to-face relations that people have 
in everyday life (Rest, et al., 1999a). Rest and al. (1999b) suggested that macromorality 
problems may address several different issues, such as the fairness of an institution, role 
structure or general practice, or whether a society or institution is organized in such a way 
that different ethnic, religious, and sub-cultural groups can cooperate in it and support it. 
Examples of macromorality judgments include the controversial issues of same-sex 
marriage, abortion rights, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (Rest et al., 
1999b). Rest et al. (1999a) described micromorality as concerning oneself with 
"generally acting in a decent, responsible, empathic way in one's daily dealings with 
others" (p. 292) and concerns a range of issues, from remembering a friend's birthday 
and being punctual for appointments, to fostering one's relationship with a loved one 
(Rest et al., 1999a). Due to this limitation, and other limitations (that are described 
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below), this study utilized the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to understanding moral 
reasoning. 
The Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Moral Reasoning 
Despite its critics, empirical evidence for Kohlberg's general theory is more 
bountiful than ever before (Narvaez, 2005). Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma (1999a) 
considered many theoretical arguments and much empirical evidence, and they still 
believed that Kohlberg had many important and useful things to say about the nature of 
morality. However, they added on some new elements, including a new definition of 
cognitive structures, in terms of schemas (instead of stages), and using different research 
strategies (Rest et al). Despite these changes, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach still shares 
several main ideas with Kohlberg's original theory, which they believed were core 
assumptions of a cognitive-developmental approach to moral reasoning. First, the Neo-
Kohlbergian perspective's starting point still emphasizes cognition (Rest et al.). For 
example, like Kohlberg, Rest et al. believe that a person's level of sophistication, in terms 
of moral reasoning, is dependent on his or her level of cognitive development. Second, 
they also concentrate their research on the personal construction of basic epistemological 
categories (e.g., rights, duty, justice, social order, and reciprocity). 
However, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach also departs from several of Kohlberg's 
assumptions and ideas about the study of morality. For instance, critics of Kohlberg have 
argued that his approach focuses on one small piece of morality in terms of relevant 
psychological processes (Narvaez, 2005). Specifically, Kohlberg believed that moral 
judgment was the only component needed to tap into other aspects, such as a person's 
motivations, sensitivities and potential for action (Narvaez). Researchers who subscribe 
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to the Neo-Kohlbergian approach agree with Kohlberg's critics and consider moral 
judgment to be just one of four psychological elements that comprise moral behavior or 
functioning; the other three being moral sensitivity, moral motivation and moral action 
(Narvaez). 
Like Kohlberg, Neo-Kohlbergian theory also views moral reasoning as ordered 
developmentally, where it is possible to "advance" morally where "higher is better" 
(Narvaez, 2005). It emphasizes the shift from Conventional to Postconventional moral 
thinking in adolescents and adults, not in stages, as Kohlberg proposed, but rather as 
moral schemas. Schemas are understood by schema theorists as general knowledge 
structures (e.g., expectations, hypotheses, concepts, regularities) residing in long-term 
memory and that are formed as people notice similarities and recurrences in experiences, 
and they help to facilitate information processing (Rest et al , 1999a). Therefore, they are 
flexible in form and adaptation and include both procedural knowledge (e.g., rules) and 
declarative knowledge (e.g., concepts and facts) (Narvaez). Further, they can be applied 
subconsciously and automatically or in a manner that is conscious and controlled 
(Narvaez). 
In the Neo-Kohlbergian approach, moral schemas are different from Kohlberg's 
concept of stages. Schemas are envisioned as shifting distributions, rather than using 
Kohlberg's staircase metaphor (Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a). For example, 
Kohlberg's notion of "hard" stages is conceptualized in terms of moving up a staircase, 
one step at a time, without skipping any steps and without reversing to go back down the 
stairs (Rest et al.). On the other hand, Rest et al.'s concept of moral schemas are "softer" 
and involve being able to gradually replace more primitive ways of thinking by more 
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advanced ways of thinking, but still being able to return to older or more primitive ways 
of thinking because it believes that we rely on different ways of thinking about most 
phenomena. 
The Three Moral Schemas 
The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective consists of three moral schemas that were 
inspired by Kohlberg's (1984) original stages of moral reasoning. It states that the 
development of moral reasoning occurs through three moral schemas (Rest et al., 1999a). 
It is assumed that these schemas guide people's thinking in everyday decision making 
and that the underlying structure of moral judgment, as assessed by the Defining Issues 
Test (DIT) (Rest et al., 1999b), consists of three developmental schemas: Personal 
Interests, Maintaining Norms, and Postconventional (Rest et al., 1999a; 1999b). 
Personal Interests Schema - Rest et al. (1999a) argue that almost all participants 
who take the DIT have viewed this schema as an earlier and more primitive form of 
thinking that they have already passed during childhood, which is in line with research 
involving Kohlberg's Preconventional stage of moral reasoning. When one utilizes this 
schema, a person is predominantly concerned with matters of personal interest and is 
unable to consider cooperation with others in terms of macromorality relationships. In 
other words, he or she has not yet discovered Society, the awareness that people do not 
only relate to each other on a face-to-face basis, but also through institutions, role 
systems, and established practices (Narvaez, 2005). Furthermore, a child utilizing this 
schema is self-focused and has a survival orientation to life, which may require 
negotiated cooperation with only others who are known (i.e., in-group reciprocity) 
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(Narvaez). Unfortunately, the DIT cannot adequately access this particular schema 
because it requires a reading level of a 12-year-old and most people who demonstrate 
predominate utilization of this schema would be under this age (Rest et al.). 
Maintaining Norms Schema - This schema tends to develop in adolescence when 
one 'discovers society' in such a way that he or she comes to understand that people are 
related through institutions, role systems, and rules (Rest et al., 1999a). There is also 
now a concern for the welfare of others (Narvaez, 2005). Further, one comes to realize 
that in addition to micromorality issues (i.e., deals with individual behaviour that is 
manifested in everyday personal interactions), that there is also macromorality issues 
(i.e., there is a formal structure of society as defined by institutions, rules, and roles) 
(Rest et al.). An individual accessing this schema would maintain that morality is defined 
by an established social order (e.g., the Law; Rest et al.) that requires everyone to adhere 
or conform to a set of conventions. Further, going against such conventions is regarded 
as inviolate, at this level (Rest et al.). In fact, obeying authority, out of respect for the 
system, is regarded as more important than interpersonal relationships and even respect 
for other people (Narvaez). This schema was derived from Kohlberg's Conventional 
stage of moral reasoning (Rest et al.). 
Postconventional Thinking Schema - The development of the Postconventional 
Thinking norm usually occurs in late-adolescent development, and it has become one of 
the best indicators of college student development (Narvaez, 2005). Rest et al. (1999a) 
argue that those operating at the highest level of moral reasoning access this schema and 
come to recognize that moral obligations are to be based on shared ideals, which are 
reciprocal and are open to debate. One using Postconventional Thinking would agree 
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that social arrangements occur in many different ways that may require people to 
conform to a set of behaviors; however, it does not mean that a person ought to behave in 
those ways because there is the realization that the Law itself can be biased in that the 
social norms favour some at the expense of others (Rest et al). Therefore, acts against 
convention can be justified as long as the act is not self-serving at the expense of others; 
the act respects others and serves group goals; and the act furthers cooperation and the 
common good (Rest et al.). For example, according to Turiel (2006), several studies on 
close relationships, such as that between a husband and wife, have shown that the 
majority of undergraduates and adults judge deception to be wrong. However, the 
participants also felt that it was more acceptable for a wife to maintain a secret bank 
account when her husband worked and tightly controlled the family finances but not the 
other way around (i.e., when the husband kept a secret bank account, while his wife 
worked and kept tight reins on the family finances). The researchers asserted that people 
take into account the general structure of power in society, when they are making these 
kinds of decisions; in this case, men are given greater power and control over women, 
and that family relationships seem to be based on the type of injustice that grants greater 
privileges and entitlements to men over women. 
The phenomenon of Postconventional Thinking can be demonstrated in an 
interesting Milgrim obedience experiment, conducted by Kohlberg in 1969. In each trial, 
the experimenter ordered the naive participant to give increasingly severe shocks to a 
confederate. It was found that 75 percent of participants who exhibited predominantly 
Postconventional thinking (equivalent to Kohlberg's highest moral reasoning stage) quit 
the experiment, while only 13 percent of lower stage participants quit (Kohlberg, 1969). 
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These results can be attributed to the ability of the Postconventional Thinking participants 
to take into account the importance of individual rights and universal ethical principles, 
over conformity and complete obedience of authority. 
Measuring Moral Reasoning 
Criticisms of Kohlberg's (1984) Interview Method - The method of measurement 
is one of the biggest differences between both approaches to moral development. 
Kohlberg utilized the interview method to measure a person's level of moral development 
(Rest et al., 1999a). The interview method requires a person to explain his or her choices 
in making moral decisions (Rest et al.). His rigorous interview procedure was called the 
Moral Judgment Interview and was assumed, by Kohlberg and his followers, to provide a 
clear window into the moral mind (Rest et al.). Critics of this approach have argued that 
Kohlberg's method is overly dependent on verbal expressiveness (Narvaez, 2005). Rest 
et al. argued that people do not necessarily have direct access to their cognitive 
operations when making self-report explanations. They stated that people can report on 
the products of cognition but cannot verbalize so well on the mental processes that they 
used to arrive at such products (i.e., their mental reasoning works in ways that they do not 
understand and in ways that they cannot explain). They further argued that this was a 
possible explanation as to why few participants could be found to possess 
Postconventional thinking in Kohlberg's studies. In other words, they suggest that the 
interview method does not elicit people's tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is outside 
the awareness of the person's thought processes, important in human decision-making, 
and is beyond a person's ability to articulate verbally (Rest et al.). According to Rest et 
al., support for a lack of introspective access has been documented in many social 
21 
phenomena research, such as studies involving: attribution, word recognition, conceptual 
priming, and expertise. 
The Defining Issues Test - The Defining Issues Test, Version 2 (DIT2) is a 
questionnaire that assesses a person's level of cognitive-developmental moral reasoning. 
It is understood as a device that activates moral judgment schemas from long-term 
memory (Navaez, 2005). Further, it is an updated version of the original Defining Issues 
Test, Version 1 (DIT1), which was first published in 1974 (Rest et al., 1999b). A meta-
analysis involving 400 studies indicates that the DIT1 has been found to be highly valid 
on several criteria that are relevant to the theoretical assumptions of the cognitive-
developmental approach to moral reasoning (Rest et al.). In their review of studies using 
the DIT1, Thoma, Rest and Barnett (1985) found that 32 out of 47 statistical analyses 
were significant for measures of prosocial and antisocial behaviour. In addition, data 
from the DIT1 has been shown to be relatively reliable (e.g., both Cronbach's alpha and 
test-retest reliability are in the upper .70's and lower .80's) (Rest et al.). Moreover, 
several studies have concluded that moral judgment scores are difficult to fake on the 
DIT (Barnett et al., 1995). 
After 25 years of using the first version, Rest et al. (1999b) came up with a second 
version that is shorter; it is more updated in terms of the dilemmas used; it has clearer 
instructions; it purges fewer participants due to a new participant reliability check method 
(see below); and it has significantly better validity characteristics than the first version. 
Their validation study of the DIT2 was able to re-confirm the basic findings about the 
moral judgment construct in terms of developmental, political attitudes and choices, age 
and education trends. It was also shown to be equally valid for both men and women. In 
addition, they used a different method of calculating a developmental score (i.e., the N2 
index; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, et al., 1997). The N2 index is the overall score used that 
measures a person's development of Postconventional Thinking. The N2 index is made 
up of two components, which measure a participant's prioritization of the higher stages, 
and a participant's discrimination and rejection of the lower stages (Rest et al.). 
More specifically, the DIT2 is a paper and pencil multiple-choice inventory that is 
designed to activate moral schemas (to the extent that person has developed them) and 
assesses them in terms of importance judgments (Rest et al., 1999b). Narvaez (2005) 
asserts that the Neo-Kohlbergian schemas measure the ways in which people answer 
macromorality questions, and how they organize society-wide cooperation with unknown 
others. They do not measure a person's ability to answer micromorality questions, such 
as those relevant to getting along with family and friends (Narvaz, 2005). It is important 
to note that, because the Neo-Kohlbergian view of moral reasoning rests on schemas that 
can be accessed given situational circumstances, and that various schemas (e.g., post-
conventional reasoning) can be more or less well-developed for people, these schemas 
can be assessed along dimensions. The N2 is the dimension that assesses post-
conventional reasoning. Everyone has a score on N2, with low scorers being less likely 
to utilize this type of moral reasoning and high-scorers being more likely to utilize this 
type of moral reasoning. While people can be categorized according to the DIT2, based 
on which schemas they primarily rely on, a more useful aspect is that scores are obtained 
for each schema. 
Despite the prevalence and severity of workplace deviance, our understanding of 
workplace deviance remains somewhat limited (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). One barrier 
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to research is the scarcity of established procedures to measure workplace deviance. 
Bennett and Robinson (2000) produced one such measure, which contained two factors: 
Interpersonal Deviance and Organizational Deviance. Interpersonal Deviance reflects 
deviance targeted at other members within the organization, while Organizational 
Deviance reflects deviance targeted at the organization itself. Examples of items from the 
Interpersonal Deviance factor are: 'making fun of, 'being rude to' or 'playing a practical 
joke on someone at work'. Examples of items from the Organizational Deviance scale 
are: 'working on a personal matter instead of working for your employer', 'taking 
property from work without permission' and 'taking additional or longer breaks than is 
acceptable at your workplace'. In addition, Bennett and Robinson believed that 
workplace deviance could occur along a continuum of severity. Therefore, their two 
factors included both serious and minor forms of workplace deviance. 
Proposing a Person-Situation Interactionist Model 
Bennett and Robinson (2003) acknowledged that past and present research has 
focused on several antecedents of workplace deviance, including: deviance as reactions to 
experiences; deviance as reflections of one's personality; and deviance as adaptation to 
the social context. Of particular interest, among workplace deviance researchers, are 
people's impressions of, and responses to, organizational justice and how that can 
translate to overt deviant behaviour in the work context. For example, not all employees 
who experience negative affects at work, in terms of perceived unfair outcomes, are 
prone to aggression or feelings of retaliation, nor do all of those who experience pressure 
from work peers engage in workplace deviant behaviour. Then why is it that people 
differ in their responses to perceived organizational injustice in the workplace? Bennett 
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and Robinson hinted that more complex relationships exist in the experience-reaction 
relationship at work. 
At the time of this writing, only one published study that has considered moral 
cognitive-development as a potential moderator in the experience-reaction relationship 
concerning workplace deviance was found. Greenberg (2002) found evidence for a 
person-by-situation interactionist approach to ethical behavior. His results revealed that 
employees who had attained Kohlberg's Conventional level of moral development 
refrained from stealing money in the face of perceived underpayment for a task when 
they worked in an office that had an ethics training or awareness program. However, 
Conventional thinkers who had worked at an organization without an ethics program 
were more likely to steal from the company in the face of perceived underpayment. 
Interestingly, he also found that those who believed that the money came from the 
organization, rather than from individual managers, were more likely to steal under any 
condition. This last finding is not surprising because the cognitive-developmental 
approach to moral reasoning works better in macromorality rather than micromorality 
situations. 
Clearly, Greenberg's (2002) findings suggest that in addition to situational factors 
(i.e., organizational justice), individual factors (i.e., moral reasoning) may also play a role 
in explaining why workplace deviance is more likely to occur in a given situation. 
However, he measured and viewed people's level of moral reasoning through Kohlberg's 
(1984) approach. Consequently, he was unable to recruit a significant sample with 
Postconventional reasoning. As mentioned earlier, Kohlberg's approach is limited in that 
samples with Postconventional levels of moral reasoning are rare and difficult to find. 
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Rest et al.'s (1999a) Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning was derived partly to 
address this issue. The DIT2 is able to purge fewer participants due to a new participant 
reliability check method, which results in stronger trends on validity criteria because it 
retains a wider range of scores (such as Postconventional Thinking scores), resulting in a 
fuller distribution of scores (Rest et al., 1999b). As a result, the DIT2 was used in the 
current study to measure moral-cognitive development. 
One of the main goals of the proposed research will be to validate and extend the 
general findings found by Greenberg (2002) with the goal of making a contribution to the 
literature about the effects of Postconventional thinking on workplace deviance, through 
the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning. This is also an opportunity to test the 
external validity of the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral-cognitive development with 
organizational behaviour. That is, can the DIT2 interact with Organizational Justice to 
predict work outcomes or work-related behaviours, such as workplace deviance? 
Specifically, it was expected that if employees experience organizational 
injustice, that some may choose to be deviant because they are better able to justify their 
deviant actions on moral grounds because the social contract has been breached by the 
employer. For example, when a worker is hired, there is a psychological contract that 
forms between the worker and the organization. A psychological contract can be defined 
as "individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of the exchange 
agreement between individuals and the organization" (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 9). Research 
has shown that a breach in a psychological contract can lead to feelings of anger and 
frustration by employees and that this relationship can be moderated by judgments of 
fairness (or Organizational Justice) (Zhao et al., 2007). As such, an employee who 
adheres to obligations of good work ethic and job performance will expect that the 
organization will reciprocate by rewarding that employee with fair pay and treatment. In 
other words, the organization also has social and moral obligations towards the workers 
and when it breaches this contract, retaliation may seem to be justified by some. 
A similar example can be illustrated with the psychological contract that is 
assumed between a nation's Government and its citizens. It is understood that if a citizen 
obeys the Law, works and pays his or her taxes, then the Government is obligated to 
justly reward him or her by maintaining adequate social programs, providing protection 
and protecting human rights (Rest et al., 1999a). However, when the Government 
breeches this contract, some citizens would consider this to be a political problem and are 
thereby able to justify unlawful acts as morally right, from cheating on their tax returns to 
committing treason (Rest et al.). As such, if we can view an organization and the 
Government as similar entities, then we can view a breach of a psychological contract as 
a political issue at both types of institutions. Therefore, this study is concerned with 
deviant actions targeted at the organization (a macromorality issue) rather than members 
of the organization (a micromorality issue). As stated before, the Neo-Kohlbergian 
approach works particularly well for macromorality issues relative to micromorality 
situations. 
The current study explored participants' deviant intentions to perceptions of two 
varying levels of organizational justice, which was manipulated using hypothetical 
vignettes. It was predicted that a person's level of Postconventional Thinking would 
moderate this relationship. Hence, organizational justice and moral reasoning acted as 
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two separate independent variables. The dependent variable consisted of participants' 
intentions of workplace deviance. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that the relationship between organizational 
justice and workplace deviance would be moderated by people's level of 
Postconventional Thinking. That is, it was expected that people who possessed higher 
levels of Postconventional Thinking would be more likely to engage in workplace 
deviance when perceived low organizational justice, relative to those who possessed 
lower levels of Postconventional Thinking. Furthermore, it was predicted that one's level 
of Postconventional Thinking would not influence workplace deviance intentions in the 
control group (i.e., high organizational justice condition). Put yet another way, it was 
hypothesized that there would not be a significant slope resulting from regressing 
workplace deviance on the N2 index (Postconventional Thinking) for the low 
organizational injustice condition, but that there would be a significant positive slope for 
the high injustice condition. 
As stated earlier, the main goal of this study was to contribute some knowledge 
on the Postconventional Thinking schema and how it relates to Organizational Justice and 
workplace deviance. Therefore, no hypotheses were made about the Personal Interests 





One hundred participants (24 males and 76 females) were recruited from the 
undergraduate Participant Pool at the University of Windsor. Participants signed up for 
the study online to earn research credit towards their psychology course. Prior to 
completing the study, participants were asked to give written informed consent to 
participate in the research study. Participants were also asked to provide their personal 
demographic information (See Appendix I). At the end of the research study, participants 
were given and read a debriefing form and were awarded their research credit. 
Most of the participants were White or Caucasian (69%). The remainder came 
from other ethnic backgrounds, such as East Asian (10%), African American (3%), 
Native Hawaiian (5%), South Asian (4%), Other (4%), or Mixed (5%). The mean age 
was 23.06 (SD - 5.55) and the median was 21.00 years. The mean for total number of 
years of post-secondary education was 2.86 (SD = .70) and the median was 2.50 years. 
More specifically, 64% of the participants had between two and four years of post-
secondary education; 20% had between one and two years; 14% had over four years; and 
4% had less than one year. Furthermore, 68% of the participants indicated that they had 
worked in retail at one time or another. Some of the retail industries that the participants 
had been exposed to included: groceries, restaurants, fast foods, clothing, movie theatres, 
furniture stores, variety stores, bookstores, shoe stores, gas bars, photography stores, 
pharmacies, fabrics, pet stores, electronics, liquor, commercial equipments, arts and 
crafts, and automotive parts. Working in a grocery store, restaurant, fast food restaurant 
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and clothing store setting were among the most frequent answers given by the 
participants. 
Measures 
DIT2 - The DIT2 was used to measure participants' level of moral reasoning. The 
DIT2 forms were ordered from the Center for the Study of Ethical Development, which is 
located at the University of Minnesota. The measure consisted of five paragraph-length 
hypothetical dilemmas, each followed by 12 issues. The dilemmas consisted of: (1) a 
famine situation in which a father ponders whether he should steal food for his starving 
family from a rich man who is hoarding food in his warehouse; (2) a newspaper reporter 
must make a decision whether to report a damaging story about a political candidate; (3) 
a school board chairperson must decide to hold a contentious and dangerous open 
meeting; (4) a doctor contemplates whether he should give an overdose of painkiller to a 
frail patient; and (5) a scenario where college students demonstrate against U.S. foreign 
policy (Rest et al., 1999b). The participant is asked to perform a recognition task, 
whereby they rate and rank the items in terms of their importance. During the 
recognition task, Rest et al. assert that as the participant sees an item that both makes 
sense and also taps into his or her preferred schema, then that item is judged as highly 
important. On the other hand, when the participant encounters an item that either does 
not make sense or seems simplistic and unconvincing, the participant will give it a low 
rating and then pass over it (Rest et al.). 
As mentioned earlier, the DIT2 has several reliability checks, consisting of several 
methods. First, the rate-and-rank consistency check flags cases that are not rating and 
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ranking the items consistently, as too much inconsistency suggests that the participant 
may have been randomly responding to the questionnaire (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). The 
second reliability check method looks for cases that have a high preference for 
"meaningless items"; these items are included as items in the questionnaire and contain 
unusual, pretentious or complex words/syntax, but are virtually meaningless to the actual 
dilemma (Bebeau & Thoma). Therefore, if a participant endorses more than 10 of these 
items on the questionnaire, then that case is deemed unreliable, as it is assumed that he or 
she is responding to a style of wording or syntax rather than to meaning (Bebeau & 
Thoma). The reliability checks also take into account missing data; that is, if there are 
cases that have too much missing data (i.e., the participant fails to rate three or more 
times and/or he or she leaves six or more rankings blank), then it is assumed that the 
participant is not taking the questionnaire seriously and consequently, is purged from the 
data set (Bebeau & Thoma). Finally, if the participant is unable to differentiate either the 
ratings or rankings of more than one dilemma, then he or she is purged from the data set 
(Bebeau & Thoma). This happens when a participant either gives all of the items from a 
story the same rating (e.g., all of the items are given 3's) and/or the participant ranks the 
same item more than once (e.g., the item is ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th). 
Organizational Justice Scenarios - Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
hypothetical vignettes that manipulated the level of organizational justice into low 
(experimental condition) and high (control condition). The context of the scenarios was 
borrowed from the vignettes created by Langton, Leeper, Piquero and Hollinger (2006) 
for their study on employee theft and low-self control. Both vignettes instruct the 
participant to imagine that he or she is a university student employed at a grocery store 
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for the past six months. Organizational justice was manipulated when the vignette either 
indicated that the manager and organization treated the student in a fair manner (high 
organizational justice) or unfair manner (low organizational justice). 
The pilot study (as outlined in the procedures section) tested several different 
vignettes that manipulated the nature of the injustice behaviour(s) as enacted by the 
manager and organization. For example, the nature of the unjustified behaviour took 
form in one of three ways: the manager gives his son a pay raise/promotion when it was 
originally promised to the student (See Appendix II); the student finds out that the 
manager's son, who just started working at the grocery store, makes more money than 
him or her (See Appendix III); and the manager cuts down on the student's hours and 
gives them to his son instead (See Appendix IV). The vignette that generated the highest 
levels of organizational injustice in the pilot study was the scenario depicting the 
promotion being given to the manager's son, rather than the student (See Pilot Study 
Results section). As a result, this vignette was used in the actual study for the low 
organizational justice condition. Finally, the high organizational justice condition 
involved a vignette that depicted the student being rewarded for his or her hard work with 
a pay raise and more hours (See Appendix V). 
Workplace Deviance - The workplace deviance intentions scale was derived from two 
sources. The first source was Bennett and Robinson's (2000) Measure of Workplace 
Deviance. Since the current study is only concerned with deviance targeted at the 
organization, only the Organizational Deviance scale was used and not the Interpersonal 
Deviance scale. The Organizational Deviance scale consisted of 12-items, but one item 
was omitted (i.e., "falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money that you spent on 
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business expenses") because it was deemed irrelevant to the hypothetical work scenario. 
Therefore, this omission left 11-items that were taken from the measure created by 
Bennett and Robinson. Data from this measure has acceptable internal consistency with a 
Cronbach's alpha of .81 (Bennett & Robinson). Further, it showed discriminant validity 
and convergent validity with other workplace deviance scales (Bennett & Robinson). 
The second source was from Hollinger and Clark's (1983) self-report survey 
completed by employees in the retail sector (N = 3,567) who engaged in deviant acts 
while working in a retail setting. The original survey consisted of 30-items, but 16-items 
were removed from this study because they appeared to be unclear, irrelevant or 
overlapped with items from the Bennett and Robinson measure. After refinement, the 
final workplace deviance intentions measure consisted of 25-items that utilized a 7-point 
Likert-type scale (See Appendix VI). 
Organizational Justice - The pilot study utilized an organizational justice measure 
(See Appendix VII). Some items were re-worded so that they were clear, personally 
relevant, consistent, and made sense with the vignettes. The respondent was asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agree with each statement on a five-point Likert-type 
scale. 
Two out of three items were borrowed and edited from Parker, Baltes and 
Christiansen's (1997) Distributive Justice sub-scale to assess participants' perceptions of 
outcome fairness. For example, the item 'If one performs well, there is appropriate 
recognition and reward' was re-written as 'If you performed well, there is sufficient 
recognition and rewards at this organization' and the item 'If one performs well, there is 
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sufficient recognition and rewards' was re-worded to say 'There is appropriate 
recognition and reward at this organization, if I perform well'. The reliability from this 
data set was .88 (Parker et al). 
Procedural Justice items were taken from a measure developed by Daly and Geyer 
(1994), which assesses the extent to which employees perceive that the company has used 
fair procedures (Fields, 2002). Two out of the four items from their Procedural Fairness 
sub-scale was borrowed and edited. For example, the item 'The organization went about 
deciding to move in a way that was not fair to me' was edited to become 'The 
organization went about deciding about the promotion in a way that was fair' and the 
item 'The steps that the company took to make the relocation decision were fair to me' 
was changed to say 'The steps that the company took to make the promotion decision 
was fair'. The reliability of the data was reported to be .88 (Daly & Geyer). 
Two out of three items from Daly and Geyer's (1994) Justification sub-scale was also 
borrowed and edited. For example, the item 'Management did not explain to me why the 
move was taking place' became 'Management did not explain to me why the promotion 
decision was made the way it was' and the item 'Management never really explained why 
the company was moving' was changed to 'Management fully explained to you why the 
company made the decision about the promotion'. The reliability for this sub-scale was 
.77 (Daly & Geyer). 
Finally, four items from a six-item interactive justice sub-scale from Moorman (1991) 
was utilized in this study. These items are: 'Your supervisor considered your viewpoint'; 
'Your supervisor was able to suppress personal biases'; 'Your supervisor treated you with 
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kindness and consideration'; and 'Your supervisor showed concern for your rights as an 
employee'. The reliability of data was .93 (Moorman). 
Social Desirability - A salient threat to validity is the tendency for participants to 
answer self-report questions in a way that they feel is socially expected, to gain social 
approval (Collazo, 2005). Therefore, social desirability was measured using the short 
form version of the Marlowe-Crown Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982) (See Appendix 
VIII). Higher scores on this scale indicated increased likelihood that the participants are 
responding in a socially desirable manner, such as over-self-reporting of socially 
desirable attitudes and behaviours and under-self-reporting of socially undesirable 
attitudes and behaviours (Collazo). However, no cut-off score is given or recommended 
for this scale (Collazo). This 13-item scale demonstrated an adequate level of internal 
reliability (ncR-20= -76) and compares well with the reliability of some of the longer 
versions of the Marlowe Crown Desirability Scale (Reynolds). As well, it shows 
concurrent validity with other social desirability scales (Reynolds). 
Design 
The current study was a one-way design with two levels. The first level was high 
organizational justice (control condition) and the second level was low organizational 
justice (experimental condition). The data were analysed using a multiple regression 
analysis (MRA) to test the null hypothesis (H0) that no relationship existed between 
organizational justice, moral-cognitive development and workplace deviance intentions. 
Further, dummy coding was used to represent the two levels of organizational justice 
(i.e., 0 = control, 1 = experimental). 
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Procedure 
Pilot Study - Prior to data collection, an application was sent to the University of 
Windsor Research Ethics Board for approval. Upon approval, a pilot study was 
conducted with 40 participants, who were recruited from the undergraduate Participant 
Pool to test for an organizational justice effect. The pilot study was designed to assess 
the participants' perceptions of organizational justice for one of four vignettes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (10 participants in each 
condition), and they were asked to read their respective hypothetical vignette. 
Afterwards, they were instructed to complete the organizational justice scale and the 
workplace deviance intentions scale. Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their 
participation and given their research credits. 
Subsequent analyses of the pilot study data were conducted to reveal which one of 
the three hypothetical vignettes that presented high levels of organizational injustice in 
different contexts would create the highest level of perceived organizational injustice for 
a student population. The scenario that was subsequently used in the study was the story 
depicting the student being passed up for a promised promotion and the promotion was 
given to the boss' son (See Pilot Study Results section). 
The main study was conducted in groups of approximately one to five 
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental condition 
(i.e., they received the hypothetical work scenario that conveyed a low level of 
organizational justice) or the control condition (i.e., they received the hypothetical work 
scenario that conveyed a high level of organizational justice). After reading their 
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respective scenarios, participants were asked to complete the workplace deviance 
intentions scale. This measure took participants approximately five to 10 minutes to 
complete. The completion of the DIT2 was counterbalanced so that half of the 
participants completed it before completing the workplace deviance intentions scale and 
the other half completed it afterwards. The DIT2 took each participant approximately 30 
to 45 minutes to complete. After completing the measures, the participants were given 
the written debriefing form, in which it was indicated that their role ended with the end of 
the experiment, and that no one would further scrutinize the consequences of their 
intentional actions (recommended by Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). The final task required 
the participants to complete the short form version of the Marlowe-Crown Social 
Desirability Scale, which took approximately five minutes to complete. Finally, 
participants were thanked for their participation and awarded with 1.0 research credit. 
The DIT2 questionnaires were scored by the Center for the Study of Ethical 
Development. 
Pilot Study Results 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that no main 
effects were present for the four hypothetical scenarios on average organizational justice 
scores. The analysis showed that a significant main effect for type of scenario existed for 
organizational justice, [̂ (3,39) = 39.79,/? < .01, a>2 = .74]. The analysis also showed that a 
significant main effect for type of scenario was evident for workplace deviance, [-̂ (3,39) = 
3.33,p = .03, CO2 = .15]. Means and standard deviations are outlined in Table 1. A post-
hoc analysis, using the Bonferroni method, revealed that all three experimental groups 
were significantly different from the control condition (in which fair treatment was 
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depicted) in terms of organizational justice scores: unfair promotion (p < .01, d — 4.85), 
unfair pay (p < .01, d= 4.12), and cut in hours (p < .01, d= 3.14). However, the unfair 
promotion condition resulted in the lowest organizational justice scores (M= 1.67, SD = 
.34). Therefore, this scenario was used in the study as the experimental condition. 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations 
Condition8 M SD 
Organizational Unfair promotion 1.67 
justice scores Unfair pay 1 R1 
Cut in hours ~ n n 
Fair treatment 3.55 
an = 10 participants in each condition. 
Main Study Results 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis for the DIT2 scores suggested that seven cases were potentially 
unreliable, according to the reliability checks that were derived from the Center for the 
Study of Ethical Development. However, Bebeau and Thoma (2003) warned that there is 
some evidence that suggests that their reliability checks can be too stringent; therefore, 
they suggest that researchers should first try running the analysis with all of the 
participants included and then again without the purged participants (e.g., those cases that 
failed the reliability checks). By doing so, it was found that purging the "unreliable" 
participants did not significantly impact or change the significance levels for any of the 






nothing significantly different or unique about these participants in terms of demographic 
information or outcome scores. Consequently, the following analyses were conducted 
with all of the participants included because the preservation of power is important for 
small sample sizes, such as this one. 
The file was first split by condition to examine workplace deviance intentions 
scores by group. From there, two outliers in the control group were revealed; that is, 
their z-scores were above 2.5. To preserve power levels, the workplace deviance scores 
for these two cases were converted to the second highest score in the control group (i.e., 
4.72). This method is generally accepted when you have a small sample size and have 
scores that are very unrepresentative that bias your statistical model (Field, 2005). 
The assumption of absence of multicollinearity was examined by computing 
Tolerance and VIF values. Since the tolerance levels were above .10 and the VIF levels 
were below 10 (cut-offs are suggested by Field, 2005), for all three of our predictor terms 
(e.g., condition, Postconventional Thinking score, and condition X Postconventional 
Thinking), multicollinearity was deemed not to be a significant problem in the data. 
Next, a histogram plot of the standardized residuals suggested that the assumption of a 
normal distribution was met by the data set. Also, a normal P-P plot of the standardized 
residuals suggested that the assumption of linearity was also met by the data. 
Furthermore, a scatterplot that displayed the standardized predicted scores and the 
standardized residuals yielded the expected random scattering of data points, which 
suggested that the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity had been met. 
Additionally, the Durbin Watson statistic was calculated to be 2.16, which was deemed 
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acceptable, as it was close to 2 (as suggested by Field), suggesting that the assumption of 
independence of errors was met. 
Influential observations were evaluated by examining standardized DIFITs 
values. By using a generally accepted cut-off of 2.0 (Field), no influential cases were 
found. To calculate outliers on v, studentized deleted residuals were examined. Using a 
value of 2.5 as a cut-off, I found one outlier; however, by looking at the Cook's distance 
statistic for this case, and by removing it from the data set and running the analysis again, 
it was determined that the case did not have an overall significant influence on the model, 
so the case was left in. Leverage values were calculated and a cutoff of 0.06 was adopted 
(derived from 2(k + 1)/N: Field). Through this, seven outliers were found on x. With the 
outliers were removed, the condition term in the regression equation was not significant, 
with the outliers included, the condition term was significant (p - .05) in the regression 
equation. It was possible that by removing the outliers that this resulted in a significant 
reduction in power for the analysis, which ultimately affected the significance of the 
condition term in the regression equation. 
This possibility was tested by calculating the observed power for the data set, by 
running a one-way ANOVA and inputting N2 scores as the covariate variable. Before 
removing the seven outliers, the observed power was calculated to be .50 and the partial 
n2 was .039. After removing the outliers, the observed power reduced to .47 and the 
partial n2 was .038. Furthermore, the regression weights remained relatively the same, 
while the p value increased when the outliers were removed. As a result, this suggests 
that the loss of statistical significance in the condition term was likely due to lower power 
of the analysis after removing these seven observations, rather than any undue influence 
40 
of the observations. Therefore, to preserve power, the MRA was run with all outliers 
included. 
Before running an MRA to test for Maintaining Norms scores as a moderator 
between condition and workplace deviance scores in a post-hoc analysis, the same 
diagnostics tests were conducted as stated previously. The data set was deemed to have 
met the assumption of a normal distribution, assumption of absence of multicollinearity, 
assumption of independence of errors, and assumption of linearity. With regards to 
outliers, one potential influential observation was found using the Cook's Distance 
statistic and two possible outliers on x, when leverage values were examined, and by 
using the same cut-off values as before. Despite removing these cases, the model was 
still significant so they were removed from the data set for the MRA. 
Also, since there was no recommended cut-off score for the social desirability 
scale, the scores were converted to z-scores and one potential outlier was found, using a 
cut-off of 2.0 (i.e., the case has a high social desirability score). However, when the 
outcome scores of that particular case were examined, nothing seemed out of range 
relative to the means, so the case was left in the data set. 
Results of Analyses 
As suggested earlier, while most people will transition from one schema to 
another, depending on the context and complexity of the situation, their answers on the 
DIT2 can suggest that they are utilizing predominantly one type or schema, more so than 
the other two schemas (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). The results showed that the data set 
contained a variation of all three moral reasoning schemas: 23% were Personal Interests 
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schema dominant; 37% were Maintaining Norms schema dominant; and 40% were 
Postconventional Thinking schema dominant. 
It should be noted that participants' moral reasoning scores were somewhat 
consistent with the scores found in the literature. For example, in Bebeau and Thoma's 
(2003) meta-analysis of 13,386 respondents, 2,096 Freshman students exhibited a mean 
N2 score of 31.05 (SD = 14.42); 1,028 Sophomore students exhibited a mean N2 score of 
31.24 (SD = 14.94); 1,333 Sophomore students exhibited a mean N2 score of 32.65 (SD = 
16.04); and 2,441 Senior students exhibited a mean N2 score of 36.85 (SD = 15.53). The 
norms support the Neo-Kohlbergian perspective that Postconventional Thinking increases 
with education level. The mean N2 scores for the current sample by educational level are 
outlined in Table 2. While the mean scores were consistent for Freshman students and 
Sophomores, they are inconsistent for Juniors and Seniors, which were lower than the 
norms found in the meta-analysis. They are also inconsistent with the Neo-Kohlbergian 
notion that Postconventional thinking increases with education level. The mean N2 score 
for the present data set was 30.00 (SD =15.12) with the average number of post-
secondary education being 2.86 years. 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for N2 Scores 
N M SD 
Vocational/Technical 1 36.27 
Jr. College 2 54.30 2.79 
Freshman 15 30.21 13.18 
Sophomore 15 25.48 15.06 
Junior 26 32.25 14.09 
Senior 34 29.72 16.67 
Professional degree 2 14.82 6.11 
Other 2 25.54 2.19 
Total 97 30.00 15.12 
Means and standard deviations for all demographic information and outcome 
scores are outlined in Table 3. The analysis revealed that the Cronbach's alpha for data 
collected from the Bennett and Robinson (2000) workplace deviance items was .90. 
Furthermore, the Cronbach's alpha for data from the final workplace deviance intentions 
measure (which incorporated items from Hollinger and Clark's (1983) survey) was .94. 
The Cronbach's alpha for the organizational justice measure was .86. 
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Table 3 












Age 23.06 5.55 
Total number of years of post-secondary 
2.86 .70 
education 
Average organizational justice score 
Average workplace deviance score 
Total social desirability score 
Postconventional thinking (N2) score 
Personal interests score 
Maintaining norms score 32.86 15.05 
"based on N= 100. 
Pearson correlations between participants' demographic information, outcome 
variables and moral reasoning scores are outlined in Table 4. One notable relationship 
that occurs within this correlation matrix is that of between age and average workplace 
deviance intentions scores; that is, age was found to be negatively associated with 
workplace deviance intentions (r = -.23, p = .02). Additionally, Personal Interests scores 
were negatively associated with Social Desirability scores (r = .22, p < .05); however, 
this finding is not surprising, as one would expect someone, who mainly cares for one's 
own self interest, to not be overly concerned with social norms or what other people may 
think of him or her. 
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Table 4 
Pearson Correlation Matrix Independent of Condition 
PSEa 
(years) 0Jb WDC SDd N2e PIf MNg 
A § e .31* -.01 -.24* .06 .08 -.03 -.04 
PSE (years) -.09 .02 .07 .14 -.09 .01 
OJ -.16 -.06 -.04 -.05 .02 
WD -15 -.02 .05 -.19 
SD .19 -.22* -.04 
N2 -.53* -.15 
_PI -.32* 
* p < .05, two-tailed. aPost-secondary education. Organizational justice. cWorkplace 
deviance. Social desirability. ePostconventional scores. Personal interest scores 
.8Maintaining norms scores. 
However, the interpretation of some of the other correlations may not make sense 
unless the condition group is taken into account. Therefore, Pearson correlations between 
participants' moral reasoning scores and outcome variables for the experimental 
condition (i.e., low organizational justice) are outlined in Table 5. It is interesting to note 
that organizational justice was not significantly associated with workplace deviance 
intentions. However, Postconventional Thinking scores were related to organizational 
justice scores but that this relationship was not statistically significant at the .05 level (r = 
-.26, p = .07), suggesting that those with higher moral reasoning levels deemed the 
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hypothetical scenario to possess lower levels of organizational justice. The fact that the 
finding was not significant may be due to the low power of the study due to sample size. 
Also, higher scores on the lowest moral reasoning schema (i.e., Personal Interests 
schema) were associated with lower social desirability scores (r = -.28, p = .05). 
Table 5 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Low Organizational Justice Condition (Experimental 
Group) 
WDa SDb N2C PId MNe 
.04 -.23 -.26 .04 .13 
.09 -.07 .02 -.15 
.26 -.28* -.02 
-.56* .11 
-.37* 
*p< .05, two-tailed. "Workplace deviance. Social desirability. cPostconventional 
scores. Personal interest scores. Maintaining norms scores. Oganizational justice. 
Finally, Pearson correlations between participants' moral reasoning scores and 
outcome variables for the control condition (i.e., high organizational justice) are outlined 
in Table 6. As expected, Postconventional Thinking scores were not related to workplace 
deviance intentions. However, the correlation matrix reveals that Maintaining Norms 
score was associated with workplace deviance intentions; that is, the more concerned one 
is with rules, laws and social norms, the less likely one is to have intentions of workplace 
deviant behaviour. While no hypotheses were made about the Maintaining Norms 






norms and organizational policy and thus, would go against the moral values of someone 
who holds these rules and regulations as highly regarded, especially in a situation when 
the organization is treating the employees fairly, as was the case in the control group 
hypothetical scenario. This is also somewhat consistent with what Greenberg (2002) 
found, which will be further discussed later. 
Table 6 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for High Organizational Justice Condition (Control Group) 
WDa SDb N2C PId MNe 
OJf 














* p < .05, two-tailed. aWorkplace deviance. Social desirability. cPostconventional 
scores. Personal interest scores. eMaintaining norms scores. Oganizational justice. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to test for mean differences between 
the condition groups and organizational justice scores, as well as workplace deviance 
scores. The analysis revealed that perceptions of organizational justice levels were 
significantly different between the two conditions, ^(95) = 20.3\,p < .01, suggesting that 
the control condition had significantly higher levels of perceived organizational justice 
(M= 3.68, SD = .43) than the experimental condition (M= 1.93, SD = .42) (See Table 8). 
Cohen's d was used to calculate the effect size and was found to be d = 4.12. 
Furthermore, workplace deviance intentions scores were also significantly different 
between the two conditions, J(98) = -1.99,_p = .05 (See Table 7), suggesting that 
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participants had higher intentions to engage in deviant behaviours at work in the low 
organizational justice condition (M- 3.00, SD = 1.25) than in the high organizational 
justice condition (M= 2.57, SD = .91) (See Table 7) where the effect size was d= 0.39. 
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Organization Justice and Workplace Deviance 
Intentions by Condition 
Condition M SD SE 
Average Justice condition 
organizational justice (control group3) 
score 
Injustice condition 









Justice condition 2.57 
(control group0) 
Injustice condition 
(experimental group0) 3.00 
.91 .13 
1.25 .18 
a« = 48. bn = 49. cn = 50. 
A multiple regression analysis (MRA) was conducted to test the null hypothesis 
(Ho) that no relationship existed between organizational justice (which was manipulated 
via two conditions) and Postconventional Thinking scores with an outcome variable that 
is associated with workplace deviance intentions. The MRA was run using the 'enter' 
entry method, which enters all of the independent variables into the regression equation 
simultaneously. This entry method was used because I wished to test for main effects 
and interaction effects, simultaneously. Prior to running the MRA, the Postconventional 
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Thinking scores were centered for the regression equation, in order to help reduce the 
occurrence of multicollinearity when constructing the interaction term (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). The MRA was run and the omnibus F-statistic revealed that the model was 
not significant, F(3,96) = 1.47,/? = .28 (See Table 8) and R2 = .04, SE = 1.10. 
Table 8 
ANOVA Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Postconventional 
Thinking x (N2xCond) 
df_ SS_ MS F p_ 
Regression 3 5.32 1.77 1.47 .23 
Residual 96 115.79 1.21 
Total 99 121.10 
The coefficients table is outlined in Table 9 and reveals that only the condition 
predictor (i.e., Organizational Justice) significantly contributed to the model (p = .05). 
Neither N2 scores nor the interaction term were significant in the model (p = .64 and/> = 
.49, respectively). With the suspicion that suppressor effects may be present, the MRA 
was run again using the 'backward' deletion method, which helps to reduce type II error 
(Fields, 2001). The same results were found; that is, only the condition term was 
significant in the regression model. Using unstandardized coefficients, the final best 
regression equation for this model is as follows: 
Workplace deviance intentions = 2.41 +.44 (Condition) + (-.01) (N2 score x Condition) + 
.01 (N2 score). 
Furthermore, the adjusted R = .014 was much lower than R = .044, suggesting that the 
model is not expected to predict workplace deviance intentions well in the population. 
Table 9 
Coefficients Table Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Postconventional 
Thinking x (N2xCond) 
B SEB P P 
(Constant) 
Condition 
N2 x condition 



















Next, an MRA for Personal Interest scores and Maintaining Norms scores was run, as 
separate moderating variables between condition and workplace deviance intentions. It 
should be noted that these are considered to be post-hoc analyses that were conducted on 
purely exploratory grounds. While the Personal Interests scores did not significantly 
moderate the relationship between condition and workplace deviance scores, the 
Maintaining Norms scores did so somewhat and the model was significant, F(l, 95) = 




AN OVA Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Maintaining Norms 
df SS_ MS F p 
Regression 2 8.92 4.46 3.85 .03 
Residual 95 110.11 1.16 
Total 97 119.03 
Table 11 
Coefficients Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Maintaining 
Norms (with interaction term) 
B SEB p t p_ 
(Constant) 
Condition 
Maintaining norms x Condition 
Maintaining norms score 
However, the interaction term was removed from the regression equation, as it was not 
contributing anything significant to the model. However, the correlation matrix suggests 
that the interaction term does play a role in this model, but there was not enough 
statistical power to detect it. Ultimately, this model accounts for 7.5% of the variance in 
predicting workplace deviance intentions (R2 = .075) but would be expected to only 





















unstandardized coefficients, the best predictive regression equation for this model is as 
follows: 
Workplace Deviance Intentions = 3.10 + .43 (Condition) + (-.02) (Maintaining Norms 
Score) 
Table 12 
Coefficients Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Maintaining 
Norms 
B SEB p t_ p_ 
(Constant) 3.10 .29 10.65 .00 
Condition .43 .22 .20 1.97 .05 
Maintaining norms score -.02 .01 -.20 -2.05 .04 
Discussion 
Past research has suggested the possibility that both situational factors, such as 
organizational justice, and dispositional factors, such as one's level of moral cognitive-
development, can impact the occurrence of workplace deviance (e.g., Greenberg, 2002). 
Research has linked moral reasoning levels to other anti-social acts, such as adolescent 
crime (Raaijmakers, Engels, & Van Hoof, 2005), disobedience, cheating, aggression, and 
alcohol and drug use (Seijts & Latham, 2003). However, such research has just begun 
and one goal of the current study was to be able to contribute something further to this 
promising area of research, for both Social Psychology and Industrial/Organizational 
Psychology, alike. The following discussion will begin with an overview of the purpose 
of the present study. It will then review the specific hypothesis that were made and 
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summarize the findings that were somewhat consistent with the predictions that were 
made, along with other interesting findings that were not expected. Possible explanations 
for the current findings will then be discussed along with suggestions for future research. 
The study's possible limitations will also be addressed, such as experimental issues and 
methodical issues. 
The purpose of this study was to explore participants' intentions to engage in 
deviant behaviour when confronted with one of two hypothetical work scenarios that 
manipulated perceptions of organizational justice. Furthermore, it was predicted that a 
person's level of Postconventional Thinking would moderate the established relationship 
between organizational justice and workplace deviance, such that people possessing 
higher levels of Postconventional Thinking would have greater intentions to engage in 
workplace deviance when they experience impressions of low organizational justice, 
relative to those possessing lower levels of Postconventional Thinking. I was particularly 
interested in examining the Postconventional Thinking schema for this study because of 
the dearth of literature relating it to workplace deviance. Unfortunately, a moderating 
effect for Postconventional Thinking was not found in this study. 
It is interesting to note that even though a scenario or situation may be judged, by 
someone holding higher Postconventional Thinking levels, as unfair, unconstitutional, 
unlawful or wrong, that this does not necessarily translate to overt retaliatory behaviour. 
It may be the case that individuals with higher moral reasoning do not engage in 
workplace deviant behaviour, as they are considered "petty" or "fruitless". Rather, 
employees may be more likely to pursue alternative courses of actions, which were not 
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measured in this study, such as quitting the job, confronting the manager, or perhaps 
taking no action at all. 
Another interesting possibility would be to contemplate the idea that 
Postconventional Thinking interacts with low self-control to predict workplace deviant 
behaviour. The concept of low self-control comes from the General Theory of Crime (as 
discussed in the introduction). Therefore, a possible direction for future research would 
be to explore several dispositional factors (such as moral reasoning and self control) as 
possible moderators between organizational justice and workplace deviance. 
Furthermore, research can explore the relationship between the Personal Interests Schema 
and low-self control because it seems intuitive that both are linked; for example, perhaps 
poor child-rearing leads to impulsivity, which contributes to one's inability to progress 
past the Personal Interests Schema. In the context of the Neo-Kohlbergian view, this 
would mean that such people would rely primarily on the Personal Interest Schema, and 
exhibit low tendencies (i.e., scores) toward using the Maintaining Norms or 
Postconventional Reasoning Schemas. Therefore, it would also be interesting to see 
whether the Personal Interests Schema and/or low-self control (as explained by the 
General Theory of Crime) interact with organizational justice to predict workplace 
deviance. 
Another reason why the data may not have supported the hypothesized 
moderating relationship may be due to the nature of the DIT2 items. One of the 
limitations of the DIT2 is that participants are asked to indicate in what course of action 
he or she feels the fictional character in the scenario should engage. Thus, it essentially 
asks what a person would condone with regards to another person's actions in a particular 
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situation, but not what he or she would do in such a situation. Perhaps it is possible that 
it may be much easier for us to condone other people's behaviours than our own. There 
are many possible reasons for this, such as the possibility that there are more factors to 
take into consideration when we are personally involved in the situation and know more 
details surrounding the circumstances. For instance, there are more personal risks and 
higher consequences for our own actions, especially when those actions are regarded as 
deviant behaviours, such as being terminated from the job or even criminal charges. 
One way to evaluate whether this might be a possibility, would be to conduct the 
study again, but with the scenarios and questionnaires changed to a third-party status; that 
is, the workplace scenarios could depict a fictional character and then the workplace 
deviance intentions measures could ask the participant to indicate how little or how much 
he or she would agree with the specific acts being committed by the fictional character 
being portrayed in the scenario. If it was the case that people are more likely to condone 
other people's behaviours, then it would be expected that the data would reveal the 
moderating relationship, as hypothesized in the current study, to be true; that is, higher 
Postconventional thinkers would be more likely to condone acts of workplace deviance in 
the low organizational justice condition than lower Postconventional thinkers. 
Interestingly, the post-hoc analyses showed that there was some support for a 
person-situation interactionist model of ethical behaviour that is somewhat contrary to 
Greenberg's (2002) findings with regards to Conventional reasoning. His results 
revealed that employees who had attained Kohlberg's Conventional level of moral 
development refrained from stealing money, in the face of perceived underpayment for a 
task, when they worked in an office that had an ethics training or awareness program. 
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Furthermore, those at the Conventional level of moral development, who had worked at 
an organization without an ethics program, were more likely to steal from the company in 
the face of underpayment. In the present study, data revealed that one's Maintaining 
Norms scores did not predict any outcome behaviours in the low organizational justice 
condition. However, the current study did not explore the effects of an ethics training 
program, with moral reasoning scores and workplace deviance, as Greenberg had. 
The current study was able to examine workplace deviance intentions among 
Maintaining Norms schema in a high organizational justice context, which Greenberg 
(2002) did not examine. It was revealed that Maintaining Norms scores did significantly 
predict workplace deviance intentions in the high organizational justice condition (r = -
.30, p = .03). This suggests that when an employee strongly values upholding rules, laws 
and customs, they are less likely to engage in deviant behaviour, especially when they are 
treated fairly by the organization. This seems reasonable, as a person who is accessing the 
Maintaining Norms schema believes that respect for the system comes before the respect 
for other people (Narvaez, 2005) and this would ring especially true in a situation when 
the organization has done nothing wrong. However, it should be noted that the MRA 
revealed that the type of condition (or level of organizational justice) was a stronger 
predictor of workplace deviance scores than one's Maintaining Norms scores, as it 
explained for 43% of the variance in workplace deviance scores, as opposed to 2% of the 
variance from Maintaining Norms scores. 
The findings from this study suggest that the Maintaining Norms schema may be 
a better predictor of workplace deviance intentions than the Postconventional Thinking 
schema, although it is too early to assert this more confidently, given the lack of literature 
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and the methodological issues present in the current study. However, since workplace 
deviance deals with issues of convention, organizational rules and laws, it makes sense 
that one who has high standards when it comes to maintaining those norms would 
perceive workplace deviant acts as a serious violation against the system and thus, would 
be strongly opposed to such behaviours from themselves or others. One direction for 
future research would be to attempt to replicate Greenberg's (2002) findings by 
manipulating the presence or absence of an ethics program, to determine whether this 
interacts with DIT2 scores to predict workplace deviance. It would also be interesting to 
try to determine whether DIT2 interacts with Organizational Justice to predict if one is 
more or less likely to retaliate against the organization (as in the present study), rather 
than an individual manager. Recall that Greenberg found that individuals are more likely 
to steal money, under any condition, when they believe it comes from the organization, 
rather than from individual managers. 
Finally, the current study did support Greenberg's (1993) findings, regarding the 
occurrence of higher theft rates in factories that had given pay cuts to its employees. The 
current study found that workplace deviance intentions were higher for participants in the 
low organizational justice condition relative to the high organizational condition. The 
implication of these findings for organizations is that it is important to stress the salience 
of organizational justice as a factor that plays an important role in the workplace. For 
example, by creating a work environment with clear rules and regulations that are 
perceived to be fair and just to subordinates, an organization can potentially and actively 
help to mitigate the costs that are associated with workplace deviance, such as economic 
costs, as well as costs to organizational morale. 
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Further, while there were no a priori predictions made, based on demographic 
factors, post-hoc analyses revealed that a significant correlation was present between age 
and workplace deviance intentions (r = -.24, p = .02), suggesting that the older one is, the 
less likely he or she is to engage in deviant behavior at work. This relationship is 
somewhat inconsistent with the literature, however, as a recent meta-analysis by Berry, 
Ones and Sackett (2007) of studies on workplace deviance showed, the relationship 
between age and workplace deviance appears relatively small (correlations ranged from -
.09 to -.12). Therefore, future research should more closely examine the relationship 
between age and workplace deviance and take into account other factors that may be 
involved such as organizational commitment, job satisfaction, financial need, etc. 
However, after exploring the demographic information in the data set, and contemplating 
possible explanations, it is still not quite understood why a stronger correlation was found 
between age and workplace deviance for this specific sample, relative to other studies. 
One possible reason why older people may be less likely to commit workplace 
deviance is because they may have more to lose if they were to lose or quit their job. For 
example, a working adult with a mortgage to pay off and a family to support may face 
greater financial and psychological consequences than a working younger student. It is 
possible that such participants existed in the current data, as over 10% of the sample was 
over the age of 25; however, this possibility is only suggestive as there were no measures 
included in the current study that would provide evidence for this explanation. 
This study was hindered by several limitations. First of all, I had chosen not to 
manipulate different facets of organizational justice for the purposes of exploring their 
interaction effects on workplace deviance. However, this decision was made 
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consciously, for empirical and methodological reasons, as discussed in the introduction. 
However, there are also good arguments to look at the different types of organizational 
justice. For example, Greenberg (1990, 2003) examined organizational justice in terms 
of Distributional Justice, while the current study manipulated both Distributional and 
Procedural Justice between the two hypothetical scenarios. Therefore, it is possible that 
the inconsistent findings between the two studies were due to the differing facets of 
organizational justice. Consequently, the effects of the different facets of organizational 
justice should be given consideration when conducting future research in this area. 
Furthermore, because the Neo-Kohlbergian approach is based on the idea that 
moral reasoning is constructed through schemas, it is impossible to know whether the 
participants utilized their predominant schemas (e.g., as assessed through the DIT2) to 
make judgments about their actions, based on the scenario that was given to them. For 
example, it is possible that predominantly Postconventional thinkers decided to use their 
Maintaining Norms schema to make decisions on whether they would retaliate against the 
organization in this specific situation. 
Another potential limitation in the current study is the utilization of hypothetical 
work scenarios, which requires participants to indicate their intentions of deviant actions, 
based on their respective vignette. As a consequence, since participants' responses were 
based on conjecture, critics might argue that there may be the possibility that people's 
answers were not an accurate reflection of what they would really do in the given 
situation (Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). However, Greenberg and Eskew (1993) indicated 
that role-playing, or using hypothetical scenarios, is a commonly used method for 
learning about different kinds of behaviour believed to occur in organizations. Further, 
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they advocated that role-playing techniques could be valid and useful for learning about 
the roles and rules that people use to guide their behaviour in organizational contexts. In 
the current study, using two hypothetical scenarios allowed us to control for possible 
confounding variables and to statistically test for differences in organizational justice 
levels as well as workplace deviance intentions. Also, to help detect untruthfulness, a 
social desirability measure was included in the current study. 
There are some final limitations to this study. First, it was suspected that a small 
sample size contributed to the data analysis' low level of power, resulting in some 
insignificant effects and relationships, which were confirmed with the low observed 
power levels. It is possible that a low sample size affected the variability in 
Postconventional Thinking scores (i.e., extreme scores were difficult to obtain), which 
may have decreased the power/optimality of the data. Also, there was not an equal ratio 
of male and female participants. This is a frequent shortcoming of research that is 
heavily comprised of an undergraduate sample. Having a lack of males in the sample 
may have impacted workplace deviance scores, as it is possible that one gender may be 
more or less likely to overtly retaliate against organizations than the opposite gender. 
Therefore, the data from this study is not as gender-representative as is generally 
accepted in social science research (e.g., a 1:1 ratio is ideal). 
In conclusion, the current study was an opportunity to validate and extend the 
findings found by Greenberg (1993; 2002). It was also an opportunity to test the external 
validity of the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral-cognitive development with 
organizational behaviour. For example, I set out to explore whether DIT2 scores could 
predict work outcomes or work-related behaviours, such as workplace deviance. 
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Greenberg (2002) had found support for Conventional moral reasoning as being a 
predictor that moderated the relationship between organizational justice and theft rates in 
plants, but not for Postconventional reasoning. This is because his method of measuring 
moral reasoning may have relied too heavily on one's verbal ability and consequently, he 
was not able to recruit enough data on Postconventional reasoning. By utilizing the DIT2 
in the current study, I was able to contribute information on how Postconventional 
reasoners think about and react to situations of organizational justice; that is, the current 
study revealed that while Postconventional thinkers may perceive a situation as highly 
unjustified, they may more so condone acts of retaliation, rather than engage in overt 
retaliatory acts themselves, for various reasons that need to be explored in the future. My 
findings were also able to extend Greenberg's (2002) findings regarding Conventional 
thinkers (which generally equates to Maintaining Norms thinkers in the current study). 
My findings showed that the Maintaining Norms schema is a significant predictor of 
workplace deviance intentions when the organization has acted justly and fairly. While 
Greenberg was able to show that Conventional thinking could predict workplace 
deviance in situations of low organizational justice, the current findings show that the 
Maintaining Norms schema may be an important contributor to decreasing workplace 
deviant behaviour in situations of high organizational justice, where workplace deviance 
can still take place. 
However, more research needs to be done to explore this phenomenon and to 
better understand its implications for organizational training and selection practices, but 
the implications look plausible and promising. Greenberg (2002) had already begun to 
explore this practical issue in his study, revealing that the presence of an ethics training 
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program can interact with moral development in the workplace to significantly reduce 
theft rates. It would be interesting to see what other kinds of organizational interventions 
can be implemented to help foster employees' moral or ethical codes, which can 
consequently reduce the occurrence of workplace deviance. 
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1. Please indicate your age: 
2. Please indicate your gender: Male or Female 
3. What is your racial/ethnic origin? Please check all that apply. 
White or Caucasian 
East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese) 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani) 
Aboriginal or Native Canadian/American 
Arab/Middle Eastern 
Hispanic/Latino 
Other. Please specify: 
4. How many years of post-secondary education do you currently have? For 
example, how many years in total have you attended school beyond high school, 
such as community college, university, etc.? 
Less than 1 year 
1 to 2 years 
Between 2 and 4 years 
Over 4 years 
4a. The retail industry involves selling goods/products to consumers. Have you ever 
worked in retail? 
Please circle: Yes or No 
4b. If yes, please indicate all of the kinds of retail settings that you have worked in 
(e.g., clothing, electronics, groceries, etc.): 
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Appendix II 
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 1 
Organizational Background: 
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario: 
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for 
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store 
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on 
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the 
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently, 
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they 
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly 
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of 
those who call in sick. One day, you ask your boss for a promotion to the position of 
assistant supervisor, which pays $11/hour. On two separate occasions, your boss tells 
you that if you continue to be a good employee, you can expect the promotion within 
three months. Three months pass, and one day, you remind your boss about the promised 
promotion. Your boss says that you will no longer be receiving the promotion. Instead, 
the promotion goes to the boss' son, who has only been working at the company for a few 
weeks. You call head office to make a complaint and the representative there tells you 
that there is nothing that the company can do. 
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Appendix III 
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 2 
Organizational Background: 
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario: 
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for 
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store 
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on 
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the 
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently, 
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they 
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly 
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of 
those who call in sick. One day, you find out that the boss' son, who just started working 
at the store, makes $11/hour. He has less experience and does not put in as much effort 
into his job, as much as you do. When you confront your boss about this, he tells you 
that other workers' salaries are none of your business. You call head office to make a 




Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 3 
Organizational Background: 
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario: 
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for 
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store 
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on 
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the 
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently, 
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they 
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly 
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of 
those who call in sick. Then, you notice that your boss is starting to cut down on your 
hours. He knows that you are working for money to go towards your tuition. When you 
confront him about this, he tells you that he decided to give the hours to his son, who is 
trying to save up money for a new car. You call head office to make a complaint and the 
representative there tells you that there is nothing that the company can do. 
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Appendix V 
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 4 
Organizational Background: 
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario: 
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for 
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store 
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on 
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the 
organization has a reputation for treating its employees fairly. You work diligently, 
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they 
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly 
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of 
those who call in sick. Within three months, your boss is impressed with your job 
performance. He decides to raise your pay to $11/hour and gives you the extra shifts you 
need to cover your tuition. 
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Appendix VI 
Workplace Deviance Scale 
Instructions: If you were confident that you would not get caught, how likely is it that 
you would engage in the following activities, at least once, at this particular workplace 
(from 1 = not likely at all, to 7 = highly likely)? 








4 5 6 
Highly 
Likely 
Spend too much time fantasizing or 
daydreaming instead of working 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I iiler \our work ai\ iu>nnKiu 3 4 5 6 7 
Discuss confidential company 
information with an unauthorized person 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I se an illegal drug or consume alcohol 
on the job 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Use sick leave when not sick 2 3 4 5 6 
Punch :i lime card for an nKcni employee 2 3 4 5 6 
Using computer time for personal reasons 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I akc care nl'pcrMmal business mi 
o>mp;m> lime 
Give away company property without the 
authority to do so 
I'sccompain fop\i i i i i Uixim: machines 
fur personal purposes 
Make personal calls when unauthorized 
to do so 
I'urpnscU mistical or break cumpain 
propcm 
Use company tools or equipment for 
personal reasons away from the 
workplace 
Keep compan\ office supplies «>r 
equipment 
Purposely damage company merchandise 
so someone can buy it at a discount 
I rkler-riny customer purchases lor 
\iuirself or annlher employee 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 
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Instructions: How likely is it that you would engage in the following activities, at least 
once, at this particular workplace (from 1 == not likely at all, to 7 = highly likely)? 
Not likely Not 
at all sure 
Highly 
Likely 
Take an additional or longer break than 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
is acceptable at your workplace 
Come in late to work without 
permission 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Neglect to follow your boss's 
instructions 
2 3 4 5 6 
Intentionally work slower than you 
could have worked 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Put little effort into vour work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Drag out work in order to get overtime 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Organizational Justice Scale 
Instructions: Based on your perspective of this scenario, please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate 





\ our sii|vr\ isor considered \our 
\ iewpoini. 
The organization went about 
deciding about the promotion in a 
way that was not fair. 
Your supervisor was able lo suppress 
personal biases. 
Management fully explained to you 
why the company made the decision 
about the promotion. 
Management did noi give \ou a 
chance lo express \our \ie\\s belore 
the promotion decision. 
Your supervisor treated you with 1 
kindness and consideration. 
I here is appropriate recognition and 
reward at lliis organization ill 
pcrfmin well 
If you performed well, there is 1 
sufficient recognition and rewards at 
this organization. 
Your supcrv isor showed concern for 1 
your rights as an employee. 
Management did not explain to you 1 
why the promotion decision was 
made the way it was. 
I he slops I hill ihe cnmp:m\ look in 1 




Social Desirability Scale 
Directions: Please answer the following statements according to your personal beliefs. 
Mark each statement true or false by checking the appropriate box. 
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
1 M>melimes feci resentful when 1 don"l nel im own way. 
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought 
too little of my ability. 
There have been times when I fell like rebelling against people in authority 
even though I knew they were right. 
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
True False 
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
1 Mnnciimo u\ u> gel even ralher than torsive and lori;ei. 
1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from 
my own. 
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of 
others. 
1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. 
i 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
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